Thursday, July 31, 2014

Case Analysis as an Effective Tool


As students of aviation, and in many cases - aviation professionals, it is part of our ongoing educational duty to research and analyze aviation from many angles. The goal of case analysis work is to utilize real world events and experiences and relate them to aviation in hopes of advancing our education on a particular subject. I could continue on and recite the merits of educational tools such as case analysis with academic rhetoric, but let me instead convey my thoughts on case analysis at the personal level.
First, let me state that the case analysis is effective. While I cannot and would not want to claim I now know everything about, in my particular case, UAS situational awareness. I can safely say that this case analysis has done what a well-designed tool should do…that is, assist me in conducting a task and accomplishing a goal. The task in this instance is learning, understanding, or any other word you want to call education. While this may seem apparent and requiring of no explanation on my part, I would argue that we often underestimate the value of research and write it off (excuse the pun) as simply another assignment. This cannot be further from the truth. Let me provide examples if I may:
Those of you who are my peers and have shared this educational journey with me so far know I am a designer by trade. Why this is relevant can be linked to the nature of both my work experiences and my mental mindset. Designers have to take into consideration people. While we wish we could disregard the needs of humans and focus on perfect designs, the fact that humans have to work in and around the equipment we develop is inescapable. That being said, my case analysis, as mentioned, deals with UAS situational awareness. You may ask how that relates to me, and I would not blame you as I have no ties to UAS personally, beyond academically. However, as I began research, the issues surrounding UAS situational awareness began to strike familiar ideas and issues in my mind. Factors such as ground control station’s layouts playing a factor in situational awareness brought to my attention the depth and effect design considerations have on just about any equipment and process. In short, this case analysis made me think. And in doing so I noticed an increase in perception, aiding in my understanding not only academically, but in my daily tasks.
Secondly, the case analysis builds upon existing knowledge and education and begins to migrate academic thinking to real world thinking. Basically, it helps translate what we have learned, and are learning, to real problems - not just in theory but in practice. This is a benefit, for another example, if I end up working in UAS design after graduation. Instead of going in to the field armed with little more than a text book knowledge, I can go in armed with a greater confidence that I understand the issues and tribulations ahead – both for myself and the UAS industry – due to research I have conducted prior to my induction.
Now that I have glorified case analysis as a beneficial tool, let me step back and make some recommendations to the process. For anyone looking to conduct a case analysis it should be made clear that you should research a subject you truly wish to understand better. While a greater understanding of situational awareness may serve me in the future, looking back there may have been more strategic topics that would have facilitated my academic goals and future endeavors more efficiently. Therefore, I believe particular emphasis should be placed on this fact. Additionally, a group option could prove beneficial to some. While personally I prefer individual research, there are many who could benefit from the interaction and brainstorming found in group research. While it should not be mandatory, an option could prove useful.
Overall this experience has proved to be one of the more stimulating and educational academic endeavors I have had the pleasure (along with headaches) to undertake. Research into new aviation fields can be difficult, but persistence pays off and I can appreciate and enjoy the benefits of completing the work, and I look forward to applying the lessons learned to my future endeavors.

UAS Ethics and Morality

The debate surrounding the morality and ethics of unmanned systems is nothing new. From the first announcement of their use in military conflicts questions have risen as to the moral implications. This debate and concern continues today, and has grown arguably more vocal in public and political circles. The intent behind UAS is good, but like any technological advancement there are concerns and questions that are asked, and rightfully so. My thoughts on the subject are as follows.

UAS Ethics and Morality
Abstract
The militant use of unmanned aircraft systems has raised many issues and concerns, particularly with the general public. The view toward UAS has been one of interest and concern, namely in the moral and ethical aspects surrounding its use. There are two major areas within the UAS debate that should be addressed; first, the current method of which we utilize this technology, and secondly, the future implications of this technology. 
Current Methods
The current use of UAS raises ethical concerns as to how this technology influences aspects of war in terms of target identification, and how we conduct war. In the terms of Linda Johansson, UAS can make war seem “risk free”. Johansson’s view, one that is shared by much of the general public, is that this risk-free approach to war gives way to ignorance of human life and will only lower the threshold for starting war (Johansson, 2011). The argument therefore lies in a comparison to what “traditional” war time actions include, versus this new approach using UAS. 
For the purpose of this paper the term “traditionally” is used to convey current and past methods. Traditionally, manned aircraft conduct all airborne operations - from intelligence to combat. This places a human in the battlefield and raises the risk and consequences of conducting war. It is for these reasons that if you remove the human element there is a fear people will conduct war recklessly or without just reasoning due to the direct risk and consequences being associated with the human element being removed from the battlefield. Kreps put it this way, “…we argue that UAVs—by shielding U.S. soldiers from injury in the field—both insulate the U.S. domestic population from the effects of an on-going war and allow strategists to avoid the logical and ethical pitfalls associated with advances in technology (Kreps, 2012).” These are just concerns, and so, many people and organizations believe new legislation and laws of war be either created, or reviewed, in light of the rise of UAS usage.
What the Future Holds
The future implications of UAS lead to a separate but equally justified concern; that allowing UAS to go unchecked into war time operations will lead to further distancing between human ethics and the way in which we conduct war. Distancing, in this instance, refers to the amount in which the human element is involved in the UAS process. Critics and proponents alike believe UAS will give way to automated technologies. Automation can, theoretically, allow for the use of UAS or other robotic technology that can identify, target, and even kill, on their own without a human element in the processing loop. Given the current state of UAS technology, even though it is growing in popularity, it is safe to assume UAS will not be implementing automation (at least successfully) any time soon. The issues behind operation and accident rates are still too high to jump to any hasty conclusions as to what the future will bring. These fears of an automated killing UAS in the future are a bit premature, however they are effecting current legislation considerations. 
Conclusion
Given these two areas of concern, both the current and future ethical implications of remote warfare, it can be determined that the correct – moral - path is not visible. Like many military, if not all, military technologies; the ethics behind the use of UAS are best determined by a case by case analysis. When armored vehicles first entered the battlefield, or machine guns fired for the first time, there were those who viewed them with moral concern. Then, like now, it can be argued that armor or any type of technology that gives the user the “upper hand” can be viewed as ethically wrong. The correct action therefore is to continue to develop UAS into a more reliable and efficient military platform, and use it in a manner that adheres to the current laws of war, as well as ethics. No one knows what the future will bring or what technology may rise that will make UAS obsolete or unnecessary. It is for these reasons UAS operations should continue; the cancellation of UAS programs will not slow the rise of automation. If time has shown humans anything, it is that technology progresses no matter what. If we do not utilize the technology as it comes, someone else will. The best action to take, therefore, is to use what technology comes along in a matter consistent with the laws, morals, and ethics found in all humans, and their societies.
Resources:
Johansson, Linda (2014). Is It Morally Right to Use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
in War? (2011). Philosophy & Technology, Vol. 24, Sep, 2011. Retrieved from: http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/1023032172/abstract?accountid=27203
Kreps, Sarah (2014). The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary Conflict: A Legal
and Ethical Analysis (2012). Polity, Vol. 44, April, 2012. Retrieved from: http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/992898373/fulltextPDF?accountid=27203

Friday, July 25, 2014

UAS Crew Selection

UAS crew selection is often debated. Should operators be required to have more training? What requirements should be met, and should operators be required to have pilot experience? These are the types of questions many are asking, professionals and the general public alike. 
In a mock exercise to try and understand crew selection, the following scenario was given; one in which a company needed to fill operator positions for two UAS, one small and one medium. The following was my analysis and recommendation to meet the company's needs.


UAS Crew Member Selection
Abstract
The company seeks to obtain crew members for newly acquired Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). The two systems, the Insitu ScanEagle and General Atomics Ikhana both require minimum crew member qualifications and training, however, they vary in their capabilities and roles and so crew selection needs to reflect this. The FAA policy document entitled, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operational Approval” outlines the requirements expected from crew members as well as the requirements the company is expected to meet during UAS oceanic environmental study operations.
Analysis
Insitu ScanEagle 
The Insitu ScanEagle is a single operator UAS. As a relatively small UAS (wingspan 10.2’) The ScanEagle does not require multi-crew operation, however due to this fact it is recommended that a highly qualified crew member be selected as all the responsibilities and requirements dictated by the FAA fall solely on one individual.
The selected individual will operate the Insitu Common Open-mission Management Command and Control (ICOMC2) ground station. This ground station is a small hand carried device, with multi-screen expansion capability. Due to these factors, it is recommended that a single UAS operator be hired with adequate training specific to Insitu if possible, be versed in the systems use, and is FAA compliant. Due to the single operation, a highly qualified individual will be knowledgeable in basic UAS maintenance to aid the company in meeting requirement stated as:
“Proponents for UAS used in public aircraft operations should follow their own agency’s procedures and guidelines to maintain continued airworthiness at a level which ensures they continue to operate the aircraft safely (FAA, 2013).”
The FAA requires this potential crew member to hold a private pilot’s license and be specifically trained in the Insitu ScanEagle as stated by the FAA when referencing the pilot in command (PIC), “(The PIC) Must be trained and qualified on the specific UAS for the conduct of the flight (FAA, 2013).” Additionally, the FAA states that, “Proponents must train all UAS crewmembers in CRM. The current edition of FAA AC 120-51, Crew Resource Management Training, or an FAA-recognized equivalent applies to UAS operations (FAA, 2013).” This falls to the company to provide CRM training to the operator, however a highly qualified applicant will hold previous CRM training. A highly qualified applicant will also be familiar with FCC licensing and frequency requirements per FAA guidelines: “Non-Federal public agencies, such as universities and State/local law enforcement, and all civil UAS proponents generally require a license from the FCC as authorization to transmit on frequencies other than those in the unlicensed bands (900 megahertz (MHz), 2.4 gigahertz (GHz), and 5.8 GHz).”
Please refer to the following excerpt outlining training and experience:
PIC Recent Flight Experience (Currency). The proponent must provide documentation showing the pilots maintain an appropriate level of recent pilot experience in the UAS being operated, or in an FAA-certified simulator. At a minimum, the PIC must conduct three takeoffs (launch) and three landings (recovery) in the specific UAS within the previous 90 days (excluding pilots who do not conduct launch/recovery during normal/emergency operations); or as prescribed by the proponent’s accepted recurrent training and currency program (FAA, 2013).”
It should be noted that a highly qualified crew member will be familiar with the Insitu ScanEagle and have successfully operated launch, recovery, and emergency operations prior to employment.
General Atomics Ikhana
The General Atomics Ikhana is a UAS platform created with research missions in mind. The Ikhana is a medium to high altitude UAS that requires multiple crew members, the selection of which should follow FAA guidelines and requirements. Crew must at a minimum hold private pilots licenses to meet FAA standards, as well as be trained specifically for the Ikhana UAS. Although FAA states the PIC is required to operate takeoff, landing, and emergency operations within 90 days of operation, an added layer of safety would be to have all crew members meet these qualifications. As such, at a minimum, a PIC should be hired with these qualifications; additional personnel who would meet the “highly qualified” status would also meet these qualifications.
Additionally, at least one crew member should understand and be able to meet the basic radio frequency requirements by the FCC as outlined by the FAA. It is assumed the company has no previous UAS experience and therefore a highly qualified candidate will be knowledgeable of FCC regulations as they apply to UAS. The unique ability of the Ikhana to perform Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) operations also requires that an observer crew member be obtained. The following requirements should be met outlining Visual Observers (VOs). According to the FAA:
“Observer Requirement. Visual flight rules (VFR) UAS operations may be authorized utilizing either ground-based or airborne VOs onboard a dedicated chase aircraft. A VO must be positioned to assist the PIC, to exercise the see-and-avoid responsibilities required by §§ 91.111, 91.113, and 91.115 by scanning the area around the aircraft for potentially conflicting traffic and assisting the PIC with navigational awareness (FAA, 2013).”
When operating long range missions, it is required that the aircraft maintain two-way radio communication with ATC when these criteria dictate so:
The aircraft is being operated in Class A or D airspace (under §§ 91.135
or 91.129) or, when required, in Class E and G airspace (under §§ 91.127
or 91.126). See subparagraph 13.q.(2) and (3) for operations in Class B
or C airspace; or
The aircraft is being operated under instrument flight rules (IFR); or
It is stipulated under the provisions of any issued COA or Special Airworthiness
Certificate.
A highly qualified crew member will be familiar with this requirement and be able to maintain proper ATC communication when needed.
General Requirements dictating Crew Selection 
The operation of UAS in public has certain requirements and recommendation per the FAA that effect crew member selection. As discussed, the company should maintain Crew Resource Management Training, and ensure the PIC maintains CRM and that no other activities occur that conflict with safe operation of the UAS. Radio frequencies should be monitored and approved prior to operation, crew members should be aware of these requirements as stated:
“Every UAS proponent must have the appropriate National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) or Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authorization/approval to transmit on the radio frequencies (RF) used for UAS uplink and downlink of control, telemetry, and payload information (FAA, 2013).”
Additionally, such factors as air worthiness must be maintained at all times, a highly qualified crew member will be able assist the companies endeavor to maintain air worthiness through proper maintenance and knowledge of air worthiness requirements.
Lastly, when selecting a PIC, medical certificates requirements must be met:
“PIC Medical. The PIC must maintain, at a minimum, a valid FAA second-class medical certificate issued under 14 CFR part 67 or the FAA-recognized equivalent. The second-class medical certificate expires at the end of the last day of the 12th month after the month of the date of the examination shown on the medical certificate listed in § 61.23 (FAA, 2013).”
Summary
While many other factors not listed make for a highly qualified crew member, these basic requirements should be met or exceeded to ensure FAA compliance and recommendation are being considered during crew member selection. Both UAS discussed require the same basic crew qualifications, however, in the case of the Ikhana where additional multi-crew and BLOS requirements must be met, the selection of crew members may vary based on their role, i.e. PIC position requires additional responsibilities. If selecting a crew that will utilize a rotating position schedule, then all requirements outlined for PIC must be maintained by all crew members.

Resources:
Federal Aviation Administration (2014). Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operational
Approval – National Policy (2013). Retrieved from: http://uas.usgs.gov/pdf/FAA/FAA_UAS_Operational_Approval_8900.207_2013_2014.pdf

Saturday, July 19, 2014

Operational Risk Management

Risk management has been the focus this week, and I can safely say that although I have not learned all there is to know, I do feel much more versed in risks and hazard assessment. While conducting analysis and reviewing all steps and processes involved in risk assessment I realized that when you start thinking about potential risk they are so numerous that it is almost disheartening to try and identify them all. However, by using certain tools we can mitigate risk and hazards to the best of our ability. The following analysis takes a look at a few of those tools:

Operational Risk Management

Abstract
Undergoing any aerospace operation requires planning and analysis. Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have a unique set of challenges beyond that of regular unmanned operations due to the deployment, mission, launch, and recovery associated with their use. It is therefore necessary to identify and resolve the unique hazards associated with sUAS operations.
This analysis will highlight some of the steps needed to document hazards and conduct risk assessment. The use of Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis (PHL/A), Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A), and Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessments, help document known hazards and suggest mitigating actions. It should be noted that it is not the intent of this analysis to identify technical or specific operational hazards and unique factors associated with a given sUAS situation, rather it is the intent to provide basic hazards to better convey the role and use of PHL/A, OHR&A, and ORM as risk assessment tools.

Analysis
This analysis uses MIL-STD-882D/E to determine probability and severity ratings to create a matrix outcome and determine risk level (RL). The following figures will be referenced in the PHL/A, OHR&A, and ORM. According to MIL-STD-882D/E:

Figure 1 – Probability Levels
Figure 2 – Severity Categories
By referencing figure 1 and figure 2 during analysis we can combine the two to determine the level of risk the hazard poses using figure 3, Risk Assessment Matrix:

Figure 3 – Risk Assessment Matrix
The first step in risk assessment is to identify initial hazards. The preliminary hazard list and analysis (PHL/A) is a tool suited for this very task. In the following example of a PHL/A the planning stage of operating a Raven sUAS is considered. The hazards listed are for example only and provide basic details. Please note the Probability, Severity, and RL columns letter and number indicators are found on figures 1, 2, and 3.


Figure 4 – PHL/A
Considerations for sUAS are dramatically different from large or medium UAS, factors such as wind and launch/runway area are of greater concern. Wind will effect a small UAS greater, often inhibiting flight. Additionally, sUAS are often used in areas not well suited for aircraft, so surrounding terrain such as trees and structures become a hazard. As listed on the Mitigating Actions column, initial steps would be to determine the surroundings, making sure wind speed is within operational bounds, and your intended flight path is clear of obstacles. Weather, and launch space are but two important factors for sUAS hazard consideration. Provided are two additional hazards more common to any unmanned aircraft system; mechanical failures, and radio issues. Again the mitigating action column suggests checking both the aircraft and radio equipment prior to launch. These are just examples of hazards within the first stage – Planning – that can occur. Each stage; Planning, Staging, Launch, Flight, and Recovery would need to be addressed and hazards identified.
The next step is to perform an Operational Hazard Review & Analysis. The OHR&A looks at what actions were taken and builds upon the PHL/A. If any change in the initial hazard track are identified then the corrective or updated action should be listed along with its evolved probability and severity, ending in recommendations for mitigation. Again, please note the letter and number designators correspond to figures 1, 2, and 3.


Figure 5 – OHR&A

Once the PHL/A and OHR&A are completed the overall operational hazard picture begins to take shape. Mitigating actions have been defined, and a checklist can be performed. The Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment is a process that aids in determining all hazards have been addressed and risk assessments performed. The following ORM was retrieved from the U.S. Air Force Air University:

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) ASSESSMENT
(OPNAVINST 3500.39 FIVE-STEP PROCESS)


Activity/Department:  ____Human Factors in Unmanned Systems - Raven sUAS_      

 
Step 1.  Identify Hazards:

a.  Has a flowchart been completed identifying major steps of   Yes No N/A
    the work process?  

b. Have applicable hazards of each step with possible causes      for those hazards been documented?  If yes, attach copy   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    (format on page 3).  If no, comment on page 2.  
Step 2.  Assess Hazards.  Each hazard identified in  Step 1 will be           assigned a “Hazard Severity Category,” a “Mishap Probability           Rating,” and a “Risk Assessment Code (RAC).”  The below           matrices are a guide for assessing hazards.
  ( x ) (  ) (  )
a.  Has each hazard been assigned a Hazard Severity Category?   ( x ) (  ) (  )
b.  Has each hazard been assigned a Mishap Probability Rating?   ( x ) (  ) (  )
c.  Has each hazard been assigned a RAC?

Hazard Severity Category Matrix: ( x ) (  ) (  )
Work Process:  ___Planning & Staging_____________________________________________________________


I (death, loss, or grave damage)
II (severe injury, damage, or inefficiencies)
III (minor injuries, damage, or inefficiencies)
IV (minimal threat to personnel and property)

Mishap Probability Sub-Category Matrix:

A (likely to occur immediately)
B (probably will occur in time)
C (may occur in time)
D (unlikely to occur)
 
Risk Assessment Code Matrix:   MISHAP PROBABILITY RATING
  HAZARD   A B     C     D
1 Critical                       SEVERITY
2 Serious              I    1 1 2     4
3 Moderate         II   1 2 3     4
4 Minor   III   2 3 4     5
5 Negligible        IV   3 4 5     5

Step 3.  Risk Decisions:

a. Have risks been prioritized and internal controls selected  
     to reduce process risks?   ( x ) (  ) (  )

b. Do selected internal controls provide benefits that
 outweigh risks?   ( x ) (  ) (  )

c. If risk outweighs benefit, does the process warrant reporting
    to higher authority as a material weakness?  Discuss issues
    on page 2.   (  )  ( x ) (  )

Step 4.  Internal Control Implementation (more than one type internal           control may apply):

a. Have “Engineering Controls” been implemented that reduce
     risks by design, material selection, or substitution when
     technically or economically feasible?   ( x ) (  ) (  )

b. Have “Administrative Controls” been implemented that       reduce risks through specific administrative actions,       such as:


OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) ASSESSMENT – cont’d


  Yes
(1) providing suitable warnings, markings, placards, signs,   No N/A
    and notices?  

(2) establishing written policies, programs, instructions,   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    and standard operating procedures?  

(3) training personnel to recognize hazards and take   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    appropriate precautionary measures?  

(4) limiting the exposure to a hazard (either by reducing      the number of personnel/assets or the length of time   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    they are exposed)?  
     
c. Is there use of “Personal Protective Equipment” (serves as a      barrier between personnel and a hazard and should be used   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    when other controls do not reduce the hazard to an acceptable  
    level)? ( x )

Step 5.  Supervision.  Is there periodic supervisory oversight of   (  ) (  )
         internal controls for the work process? ( x ) (  ) (  )



ORM Assessment conducted by:  ____Brandon Espinoza_________________Date:____7/16/2014_____



ORM Assessment reviewed by:  _________________________________________________Date:______________
    (Dept Head)




ISSUES/COMMENTS ACTIONS (Include estimated completion dates)


Summary
Risk assessment and hazard identification are necessary to any operation and sUAS have their own set of unique risks and hazards associated with their use. Through the use of PHL/A, OHR&A, and ORM assessments, hazards can be systematically identified for all stages of operation. Much like product development, the stages of UAS operations each have their own unique risks and hazards. It is impossible for the mind to keep track of all possible risks and hazards, therefore utilizing tools such as these can help mitigate incidents from occurring by determining hazards before operations begin through brainstorming and experience.

References:
Barnhart, Richard K. Shappee, Eric Marshall, Douglas M. (2014). Introduction to Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (2011). CRC Press, London, GBR. 10/2011.
Department of Defense (2014). MIL-STD-882E – System Safety (2012). Retrieved from:
http://www.system-safety.org/Documents/MIL-STD-882E.pdf
U.S. Air Force Air University (2014). Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment
(OPNAVIINST 3500.39 FIVE-STEP PROCESS) Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/orm_assessment.pdf

Friday, July 11, 2014

Automation

WOW! What an interesting study on automation over the past few days. Many discussions between peers and a lot of interesting ideas that were truly thought provoking. The idea that automated killer UAS could spring up really puts advancements in the field into focus and makes you ask the question, "where is this heading?". Personally the speech by Daniel Suarez was just a story. As a science fiction writer he knows how to weave a tale, but some of his points were legitimate and I am certain we will a few key points of his come to light.
One thing is for sure, automated systems are not going anywhere and are only improving. To that point I wrote on a automatic take off and landing system developed by Northrop Grumman. It is an interesting project they are working on and it is nearing completion. Here is what I found:

Automatic Takeoff and Landing
Abstract
Automatic takeoff and landings (ATOL) are a great asset to UAS and manned aircraft as they have to potential to reduce accident rates and save valuable equipment. While many systems are still in research and development, and much of the information pertaining to ATOL has not been released to the general public, there is one system of note that has been ground-breaking. The ATOL system developed by Northrop Grumman is being used in both the X-47B unmanned system, as well as F/A-18 hornet.
Analysis
The U.S. Navy is using flight control software designed for the X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) Carrier Demonstration Program. The purpose of the program which was awarded to Northrop Grumman in 2007 was to produce autonomous aircraft that were to be used to demonstrate the first ever carrier-based launches and recoveries by “…low-observable relevant unmanned aircraft (Northrop Grumman, 2014).” The X-47B uses GPS rather than radar based guidance to execute the automated commands. The system does not rely on a remote pilot, it is given instructions and it executes them autonomously. The technology found in the X-47B is also being tested in F/A-18 Hornets. The aircraft has successfully landed by its self on the deck of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) using the X-47B flight control software (DefenseTech, 2011). It should be noted that there was no ground controller as is common in many UAS, rather the aircraft carriers air traffic control (ATC) sends a command to the system and the aircraft enters the landing pattern, “…and execute the landing all on its own; the same way a piloted jet would (DefenseTech, 2011). The aircraft not being piloted remotely actually uses flight rules placed by ATC to execute landing instructions. The automated system uses GPS data transmitted over Rockwell Collins’ Tectical Targeting Network Technology. The GPS system allows for 360-degree coverage around the ship, a vast improvement over older radar based automatic systems which had limited coverage around the stern of the carrier. Additionally, the GPS/Rockwell Collins system allows for multiple aircraft to be controlled at a time, while no exact numbers are given, it is stated by NAVAIR officials that the technology allows for more control over the radar based systems. The GPS system also allows for manual input in case there is a need to abort a landing, DefenseTech stated, “In the final phase of the approach, the LSO can even order the jet to wave off using his terminal that has been modified to communicate with an unmanned jet, according to NAVAIR officials.”
Summery
ATOL is a valuable asset to UAS and manned aircraft. The addition of this particular Northrop Grumman system, which is designed specifically with aircraft carrier landings in mind, will make the difficult task of carrier landing easier for both manned and unmanned aircraft. The cost savings, and more importantly the human factor benefits being developed will save lives and guide future technologies. This technology has been recognized by Popular Mechanics through their Breakthrough Innovator Award. The award recognizes positive innovations and Popular Mechanics said it selected the X-47B because it “…is the first UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) to land safely on the deck of an aircraft carrier without a human pilot. Its technology may lead to more accurate autopilot systems in private and commercial aircraft, as well as safer self-driving cars.”
ATOL is yet another step in making UAS safe, it is a positive step toward proving safety and reliability in UAS to the defense and private sectors and should help usher in their eventual implementation into the national airspace system.

References:
Reed, John (2014). Navy One Step Closer To UAV Carrier Ops (2011). DEFENSETECH, July
7, 2011. Retrieved from: http://defensetech.org/2011/07/07/navy-one-step-closer-to-uav-carrier-ops/
Northrop Grumman Corporation (2014). Capabilities – X-47B UCAS (2014). Retrieved from:
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Pages/default.aspx
Northrop Grumman Corporation (2014). Northrop Grumman, U.S. Navy Catapult X-47B From
Carrier Into History Books (2013). Media Resources News releases, May 14, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.globenewswire.com/newsarchive/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=10032846

Thursday, July 3, 2014

Shift Work Disorder

This week was interesting for sure. I got to put into practice research done on Sleep Work Disorder (SWD). In a mock exercise I used information I gathered from very interesting publications on the disorder and applied it to a imaginary MQ-1 Predator crew suffering from fatigue due to shift work. The following is my analysis.

Shift Work Schedule
-Brandon Espinoza

Abstract

While no definite work schedule has been established, partially due to the varying nature of numerous industries and workers individual internal factors, studies have shown there are certain measures that can be made to decrease the negative effects of fatigue, stress, and general well-being in shift workers. This analysis looks at a MQ-1B Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAS squadron and uses a research based schedule to aid in reducing the growing number of fatigue related complaints by crews.
Scheduling Factors
      While considerations for development were being made certain factors were implemented and key research done by Dr. Michael J. Thorpy concerning viable solutions to mitigate shift work disorder (SWD) were incorporated into the schedule. Dr. Thorpy states, “Additional studies evaluating the effects of >4 consecutive night shifts…confirm the risk for decreased cognitive performance and increased sever ES. The observed marked increase in the risk for incidents during working hours suggests that working more than 4 consecutive 12-hour night shifts should be avoided (Thorpy, 2010).” It is by this suggestion that the three day on – one day off schedule was derived. This should place the crew well under the suggested work/rest hours as their shifts are under 12 hours. In a study conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School it was found during a re-visitation of work-related fatigue that, “…the number of consecutive days off was increased from two to three in order to provide greater opportunity for recovery sleep. However, study results differed markedly from this expectation. Mean fatigue scores were unchanged compared to one year before with the exception of the CIS-CON (checklist individual strength concentration subscale) scale, a measure of mental fatigue, for which scores were significantly higher compared to the prior year.” Thus in the MQ-1B schedule there has been an attempt to implement more frequent rest periods rather than longer ones which studies have shown offer no aid in fatigue reduction.
SWD Aids
  Other factors should be considered beyond scheduling changes as the severity of SWD is manifesting itself in the MQ-1B crew and causing performance issues. According to Dr. Thorpy, “Several nonpharmacologic interventions are available for the treatment of SWD, such as the improvement of sleep hygiene, exercise, and timed exposure to light.” Additionally he identifies, “Two pharmacologic agents – modafinil and its R-enantiomer armodafinil – have been evaluated specifically in patients with excessive sleepiness (ES) associated with SWD and are approved as wakefulness-promoting agents for this indication by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Thorpy, 2010).” While the agents are not recommended to this squadron at this time, the use of the agents should be noted as a viable option should chronic fatigue related complaints continue after revised schedule implementation. As for the nonpharmacologic interventions, it is suggested to the MQ-1B crew that they make use of exercise and light-therapies both during breaks and off-duty days. These aids will be especially useful for crews operating at night, and special emphasis should be placed on their use to these crews.

Recommendations

Recommended measures are summarized and are as follows:
- Move to a three day on, one day off schedule
- Take advantage of nonpharmacologic interventions – especially for night shift crews
- If needed, pharmacologic options should be evaluated and implemented by a case by case individual basis
- Emphasis to crews the importance of quality sleep of quantity – exercise and sleep hygiene will aid in this
- Educate crew members on fatigue and stress, create an organizational climate supporting safe work and        rest schedules

References:
Tvaryanas, A. Platte, W. Swigart, C. Colebank, J. Miller, N. (2014). A Resurvey of Shift
Work-Related Fatigue in MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System Crewmembers (2008). Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. Retrieved from: file:///C:/Users/Doctor/Downloads/ADA477976.pdf
Thorpy, M. (2014). Managing the patient with shift-work disorder (2010). Supplement to
The Journal of Family Practice. January 2010 / Vol 59, No 1. Retrieved from: http://media.mycme.com/documents/29/culpepper_2010_swd_suppl_70