Saturday, July 19, 2014

Operational Risk Management

Risk management has been the focus this week, and I can safely say that although I have not learned all there is to know, I do feel much more versed in risks and hazard assessment. While conducting analysis and reviewing all steps and processes involved in risk assessment I realized that when you start thinking about potential risk they are so numerous that it is almost disheartening to try and identify them all. However, by using certain tools we can mitigate risk and hazards to the best of our ability. The following analysis takes a look at a few of those tools:

Operational Risk Management

Abstract
Undergoing any aerospace operation requires planning and analysis. Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have a unique set of challenges beyond that of regular unmanned operations due to the deployment, mission, launch, and recovery associated with their use. It is therefore necessary to identify and resolve the unique hazards associated with sUAS operations.
This analysis will highlight some of the steps needed to document hazards and conduct risk assessment. The use of Preliminary Hazard List and Analysis (PHL/A), Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A), and Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessments, help document known hazards and suggest mitigating actions. It should be noted that it is not the intent of this analysis to identify technical or specific operational hazards and unique factors associated with a given sUAS situation, rather it is the intent to provide basic hazards to better convey the role and use of PHL/A, OHR&A, and ORM as risk assessment tools.

Analysis
This analysis uses MIL-STD-882D/E to determine probability and severity ratings to create a matrix outcome and determine risk level (RL). The following figures will be referenced in the PHL/A, OHR&A, and ORM. According to MIL-STD-882D/E:

Figure 1 – Probability Levels
Figure 2 – Severity Categories
By referencing figure 1 and figure 2 during analysis we can combine the two to determine the level of risk the hazard poses using figure 3, Risk Assessment Matrix:

Figure 3 – Risk Assessment Matrix
The first step in risk assessment is to identify initial hazards. The preliminary hazard list and analysis (PHL/A) is a tool suited for this very task. In the following example of a PHL/A the planning stage of operating a Raven sUAS is considered. The hazards listed are for example only and provide basic details. Please note the Probability, Severity, and RL columns letter and number indicators are found on figures 1, 2, and 3.


Figure 4 – PHL/A
Considerations for sUAS are dramatically different from large or medium UAS, factors such as wind and launch/runway area are of greater concern. Wind will effect a small UAS greater, often inhibiting flight. Additionally, sUAS are often used in areas not well suited for aircraft, so surrounding terrain such as trees and structures become a hazard. As listed on the Mitigating Actions column, initial steps would be to determine the surroundings, making sure wind speed is within operational bounds, and your intended flight path is clear of obstacles. Weather, and launch space are but two important factors for sUAS hazard consideration. Provided are two additional hazards more common to any unmanned aircraft system; mechanical failures, and radio issues. Again the mitigating action column suggests checking both the aircraft and radio equipment prior to launch. These are just examples of hazards within the first stage – Planning – that can occur. Each stage; Planning, Staging, Launch, Flight, and Recovery would need to be addressed and hazards identified.
The next step is to perform an Operational Hazard Review & Analysis. The OHR&A looks at what actions were taken and builds upon the PHL/A. If any change in the initial hazard track are identified then the corrective or updated action should be listed along with its evolved probability and severity, ending in recommendations for mitigation. Again, please note the letter and number designators correspond to figures 1, 2, and 3.


Figure 5 – OHR&A

Once the PHL/A and OHR&A are completed the overall operational hazard picture begins to take shape. Mitigating actions have been defined, and a checklist can be performed. The Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment is a process that aids in determining all hazards have been addressed and risk assessments performed. The following ORM was retrieved from the U.S. Air Force Air University:

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) ASSESSMENT
(OPNAVINST 3500.39 FIVE-STEP PROCESS)


Activity/Department:  ____Human Factors in Unmanned Systems - Raven sUAS_      

 
Step 1.  Identify Hazards:

a.  Has a flowchart been completed identifying major steps of   Yes No N/A
    the work process?  

b. Have applicable hazards of each step with possible causes      for those hazards been documented?  If yes, attach copy   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    (format on page 3).  If no, comment on page 2.  
Step 2.  Assess Hazards.  Each hazard identified in  Step 1 will be           assigned a “Hazard Severity Category,” a “Mishap Probability           Rating,” and a “Risk Assessment Code (RAC).”  The below           matrices are a guide for assessing hazards.
  ( x ) (  ) (  )
a.  Has each hazard been assigned a Hazard Severity Category?   ( x ) (  ) (  )
b.  Has each hazard been assigned a Mishap Probability Rating?   ( x ) (  ) (  )
c.  Has each hazard been assigned a RAC?

Hazard Severity Category Matrix: ( x ) (  ) (  )
Work Process:  ___Planning & Staging_____________________________________________________________


I (death, loss, or grave damage)
II (severe injury, damage, or inefficiencies)
III (minor injuries, damage, or inefficiencies)
IV (minimal threat to personnel and property)

Mishap Probability Sub-Category Matrix:

A (likely to occur immediately)
B (probably will occur in time)
C (may occur in time)
D (unlikely to occur)
 
Risk Assessment Code Matrix:   MISHAP PROBABILITY RATING
  HAZARD   A B     C     D
1 Critical                       SEVERITY
2 Serious              I    1 1 2     4
3 Moderate         II   1 2 3     4
4 Minor   III   2 3 4     5
5 Negligible        IV   3 4 5     5

Step 3.  Risk Decisions:

a. Have risks been prioritized and internal controls selected  
     to reduce process risks?   ( x ) (  ) (  )

b. Do selected internal controls provide benefits that
 outweigh risks?   ( x ) (  ) (  )

c. If risk outweighs benefit, does the process warrant reporting
    to higher authority as a material weakness?  Discuss issues
    on page 2.   (  )  ( x ) (  )

Step 4.  Internal Control Implementation (more than one type internal           control may apply):

a. Have “Engineering Controls” been implemented that reduce
     risks by design, material selection, or substitution when
     technically or economically feasible?   ( x ) (  ) (  )

b. Have “Administrative Controls” been implemented that       reduce risks through specific administrative actions,       such as:


OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) ASSESSMENT – cont’d


  Yes
(1) providing suitable warnings, markings, placards, signs,   No N/A
    and notices?  

(2) establishing written policies, programs, instructions,   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    and standard operating procedures?  

(3) training personnel to recognize hazards and take   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    appropriate precautionary measures?  

(4) limiting the exposure to a hazard (either by reducing      the number of personnel/assets or the length of time   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    they are exposed)?  
     
c. Is there use of “Personal Protective Equipment” (serves as a      barrier between personnel and a hazard and should be used   ( x ) (  ) (  )
    when other controls do not reduce the hazard to an acceptable  
    level)? ( x )

Step 5.  Supervision.  Is there periodic supervisory oversight of   (  ) (  )
         internal controls for the work process? ( x ) (  ) (  )



ORM Assessment conducted by:  ____Brandon Espinoza_________________Date:____7/16/2014_____



ORM Assessment reviewed by:  _________________________________________________Date:______________
    (Dept Head)




ISSUES/COMMENTS ACTIONS (Include estimated completion dates)


Summary
Risk assessment and hazard identification are necessary to any operation and sUAS have their own set of unique risks and hazards associated with their use. Through the use of PHL/A, OHR&A, and ORM assessments, hazards can be systematically identified for all stages of operation. Much like product development, the stages of UAS operations each have their own unique risks and hazards. It is impossible for the mind to keep track of all possible risks and hazards, therefore utilizing tools such as these can help mitigate incidents from occurring by determining hazards before operations begin through brainstorming and experience.

References:
Barnhart, Richard K. Shappee, Eric Marshall, Douglas M. (2014). Introduction to Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (2011). CRC Press, London, GBR. 10/2011.
Department of Defense (2014). MIL-STD-882E – System Safety (2012). Retrieved from:
http://www.system-safety.org/Documents/MIL-STD-882E.pdf
U.S. Air Force Air University (2014). Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment
(OPNAVIINST 3500.39 FIVE-STEP PROCESS) Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/orm_assessment.pdf

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